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Abstract
The paper discusses the nature and role
of knowledge in a socio-economic life
marked by genuine uncertainty. The
starting point is to regard that uncertain
environments render knowledge fallible
and contingent. Knowledge is fallible for
reasons associated both with interactions in
space taking place at the same time
(complexity), and with the passage of time.
The paper stresses two types of
knowledge, namely, “knowledge how” and
“knowledge that”. The former is the
k n o w l e d g eo ft h ew a yw ep e r f o r m
something and the latter is the knowledge
of why it is that we perform something.
One way that agents find to cope with the
condition of fallible knowledge is to resort
to conventions (Keynes) and rules (Hayek).
Conventions and rules are the repository of
a social, intersubjective form of knowledge,
which agents may acquire, store and
communicate with each other. They partly
provide the necessary information for the
undertaking of their daily activities.
Resumo
Oa r t i g od i s c u t ean a t u r e z ad oc o n h e c i m e n t oe mu m
ambiente sócio-econômico caracterizado por incerteza
genuína. O ponto de partida é considerar que ambi-
entes incertos tornam o conhecimento falível e con-
tingente. O conhecimento é falível tanto em virtude
de interações no espaço que acontecem ao mesmo
tempo (complexidade), como devido à passagem do
tempo. O artigo enfatiza dois tipos de conhecimento:
“knowledge how” e “knowledge that”.Op r i -
m e i r oc o n s i s t ee mu mt i p od ec o n h e c i m e n t oa c e r c ad o
m o d oc o m of a z e m o sa l g oeos e g u n d oe mu mt i p od e
conhecimento acerca do porque fazemos algo.
Uma forma que os agentes encontrampara lidarcom
acondiçãodeconhecimentofalívelérecorreraconven-
ções (Keynes) e regras (Hayek). Convenções e regras
são uma espécie de reservatório de uma forma de co-
nhecimento social e intersubjetiva que os agentes po-
demadquirir,armazenarecomunicarunscomosou-
tros. Elas fornecememparte a informação necessária
para o desempenho de suas atividades cotidianas.
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B50, D80.1_ Introduction
This paper discusses aspects and
characteristics of human (limited)
knowledge in a context where agents
have to cope with genuine uncertainty.
By definition, uncertainty is a situation
in which people taking decisions have
to come to terms with the fact that they
possess scarce knowledge (or no
knowledge at all). It is a pervasive fact
of life. In other words, in the presence
of uncertainty, knowledge is fallible and
contingent, subject to change and
revision in the light of observed
realised results. Such features render
problematic the accounts based on
some sort of fixity of the world or the
material reality.
Although uncertainty is
sometimes regarded as synonymous
with lack or scarcity of knowledge,
and emphasis is put on the fact that
agents do not have sufficient
knowledge to take their decisions in
many circumstances, the general idea
here is to scrutinise the features of
this limited knowledge, that is, to pose
the question of the nature and scope
of knowledge people have in a
context of uncertainty.
All this calls for the possibility of
errors of evaluation, failed expectations,
miscalculations and deficient
predictions. Under uncertainty,
acquisition of knowledge by agents
and action based upon it is not trivial.
Limitations of various sorts bring about
limitations to behaviour. But, as Keynes
(1937b, p. 124) asserts, notwithstanding
the fact of uncertainty, that limitations
o fk n o w l e d g ea r eap e r v a s i v ef e a t u r eo f
t h er e a lw o r l d ,p e o p l eh a v et oa c t .
Action in the face of uncertainty
requires some sort of “substitute for the
knowledge which is unattainable”
(Keynes, 1937b, p. 124) which serves as
guide for agents. The paper stresses
t h er o l eo fs o m eo ft h e s e“ s u b s t i t u t e s ” ,
namely, the socio-economic
structures (like conventions and rules)
which govern decision-making
processes in the presence of fallible
and contingent knowledge.
2_ What knowledge is
But what is knowledge? A first step is
to regard that, at a more general level,
knowledge can be seen as “justified
true belief” (O’Hear, 1985, chapter 2).
For a person A and a statement or a
proposition p, we say that A knows
that p if and only if the following
clauses apply:
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2. p is true;
3. A has good reasons for believing
p is true (justification).
We need then to address how to
hold a justified true belief, that is, to
know something. In relation to this, it is
also important to consider the idea that
we cannot have knowledge unless the
idea of our being mistaken makes sense.
We cannot say that our beliefs
about something are categorically true
(certain knowledge) but only that they
have a possibility of being true. We
cannot plausibly claim to have a definite
picture of a reality which undergoes
change, even if we ascribe some degree
of stability to some perceived
regularities or active structures and
relations, and are to some extent
confident that they will hold in the
future. Each of our accepted beliefs
may turn out to be false, and many of
them will in fact turn out to be false.
A given state of knowledge
represents the best we can use here and
now to solve the problems at hand.
New knowledge may not supplement a
previous state but instead disturb it. It
is the tension between novelty and
permanence which shapes knowledge
people possess. Knowledge is the result
of people’s activities and as such is
subject to change, although things can
remain “the same” for a long time.
What we call knowledge is a
provisional state of things which can or
may not be validated by the sequence of
events in the world. Change affects
knowledge. Knowledge may change
incrementally and discontinuously.
If things continue as before, or as
expected, there arise no new concerns
in terms of decision, no need to devise
a new plan of action. The more one
believes change has not important
consequences, the more one is prone to
believe in the long-run stability of a
state of things or perceived regularities.
But it is the belief in the constancy of
things and the making of decisions
according to this belief, which brings
so many problems in environments
marked by novelty. This is a situation
people cannot escape from.
The process of change comes
with time and involves both chance
events and what Shackle (e. g., 1961)
calls “crucial decisions” or
“non-divisible non-seriable
experiments”; they bring new and
unexpected circumstances to the fore.
T h ek n o w l e d g ep e o p l eh a v eh a st ob e
checked permanently against a reality in
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so that there will always be new
relations which ultimately threaten our
current cognitive constructions.
Although we can predict that our
knowledge will fail and will have to be
replaced or modified, we cannot predict
how and when this will happen.
People take part in a stream of
events and have to cope with the fact
that it contains some surprises. Indeed,
many of these surprises are the result of
people’s own actions. Reactions to
surprises may entail alterations of
previous frameworks and structures for
actions such as conventions, rules,
policies, routines etc. Some actions do
intend to render the future different
from what it would be without such
actions (Loasby, 1976, p. 7). The very
act of aiming at a goal inserts new data
into the environment. Also, different
people in different situations have
better conditions to make a better use
of their resources and, therefore, may
be more effective in producing new
knowledge – what Loasby (1986,
p. 52-53) calls “diversity of perceptions
and diversity of conjectures”.
Knowledge is a provisional
portrait of the flux of events; therefore,
it may be subject to revision. All form
of knowledge, including probabilistic
knowledge, is by necessity fallible and
contingent knowledge. As suggested by
Russell and Keynes, knowledge is
always associated with a component of
certainty or doubt.
Successful innovation brings
about change and the need to check
and revise our previous knowledge.
Novelty, resulting from a forward
time flow, is the drive impinging
on knowledge the possibility
of its obsolescence.
Agents have some safeguards at
their disposal to cope with the potential
fallible, contingent character of
knowledge, a hedge against the
unstoppable urgencies of the new. As a
rule, they resort to amendments such as
“more or less”, “normally”, “in ordinary
circumstances”, “by and large”, “if all
things are equal”, and so on. Problems
arise when one strives for precision and
universality, as in the scientific
enquiry. Fallible knowledge and
vagueness are akin; paradoxically, the
search for precision may increase our
degree of ignorance:
The price of precision is not only error,
but ignorance: the rigorous theorist or
experimenter doesn’t know what it
is he doesn’t know.If we become
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make more effective use of the sufficiency
of abstractions, and avoid paying
such a high price for precision
(Loasby, 1976, p. 50 and 57).
The “pretence of knowledge” is
a theme which has attracted the
attention of authors like, for instance,
Hayek (1974). In a world marked by
“essentially complex phenomena”
the acquisition of quantitative
knowledge about many events is by
force limited and may even not
comprise important aspects of these
events. All the facts and events that
govern the dynamics of
socio-economic processes cannot be
fully known or measurable.
It is precisely the pretence
that we can do implausible things
w i t ht h ek n o w l e d g et h a tw ea r e
able to gather that led some people
to believe that conventional
economic theory is a project doomed
to severe limitations or even
utter failure:
Economics has veritably turned
imprecision itself into a science:
economics, the science of the
quantification of the unquantifiable and
the aggregation of the incompatible
(Shackle, 1972, p. 360).
3_ The problem of induction
One way of deriving knowledge from
experience is through the inductive
method. The problem is that no logical
derivation is possible, for irrespective of
the number of occurrences of an event,
there is no strong justification for the
conclusion that it will occur with
certainty next time. This is the problem
of induction, originally raised by Hume:
experience of the past or the present
affords no assurance of the future.
The principle of induction may
be stated in the following manner:
(a) The greater the number of cases in
which a thing of the sort A has been
found associated with a thing of the sort
B, the more probable it is (if no cases
of failure of association are known) that
A is always associated with B;
(b) Under the same circumstances, a
sufficient number of cases of the
association of A with B will make it
nearly certain that A is always
associated with B, and will make this
general law approach certainty without
limit (Russell, 1912, p. 37).1
The belief in the uniformity of
nature underlies the principle of
induction (Keynes, 1921). However, we
have no reason for assuming that
uniformities and associations which
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1 But, as Russell says,
expectations based on this
principle may be misleading:
“The man who has fed the
chicken every day throughout
its life at last wrings its neck
instead, showing that more
refined views as to the
uniformity of nature would
have been useful to the
chicken” (Russell, 1912, p. 35).have always been held in the past allow
us to suppose that they will hold in the
future. The belief that the future will
r e s e m b l et h ep a s ti sj u s tab e l i e f–f o r
Keynes (1937a, 1937b), for instance, it
characterises a convention. It may
prove correct or incorrect after the
situation we expected to happen really
happens or not. It has something of the
nature of a guess or of a bet.
In view of this, one needs to be
more flexible in accounting for some
aspects of the nature of knowledge:
“knowledge” is not a precise conception:
it merges into “probable opinion”.
A very precise definition, therefore,
should not be sought, since any such
definition must be more or less
misleading.[A]ll our knowledge of
truths is infected with some degree of
doubt, and a theory which ignored this fact
would be plainly wrong (Russell, 1912, p. 78).
What one is faced with are then
gradations of knowledge – a gradient
whose extremes are certain knowledge
and complete ignorance. This implies
the possibility of error in judgement,
the possibility of (partially) knowing
something instead of certainly knowing
something. Thus, what is called
knowledge can be better described as
“probable opinion”:
What we firmly believe, if it is true, is
called knowledge,p r o v i d e di ti se i t h e r
intuitive or inferred (logically or
psychologically) from intuitive knowledge
from which it follows logically. What we
firmly believe, if it is not true, is called
error.W h a tw ef i r m l yb e l i e v e ,i fi ti s
neither knowledge or error, and also
what we believe hesitatingly because it
is, or is derived from, something which
has not the highest degree of
self-evidence, may be called probable
opinion. Thus the greater part of what
would commonly pass as knowledge is
more or less probable opinion
(Russell, 1912, p. 81).
Thus, a “search for certainty”,
or a clear-cut “criterion of truth”, is
useless. An indubitable basis of
knowledge, which may be either reason,
as for the rationalists, or experience,
as for the empiricists, is not in general
available. Our beliefs about our current
surroundings and about the future
are not on a firm ground; they are
intrinsically not well supported.
On the other hand, it is
problematic to state simply that
everything is radical unknowledge and
ignorance, the fact of uncertainty
notwithstanding. There are layers or
degrees of uncertainty (Dow, 1995).
Consequently, there are also
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agents may have different levels or
amounts of (quantitative and
qualitative) knowledge for being in
different contexts as to distinct degrees
of uncertainty. For instance, after the
introduction of a successful innovation
i nas p e c i f i cm a r k e to ri n d u s t r ys o m e
firms will benefit while others will face
a novel situation without knowing
ap r i o r iif they will be able to adapt
themselves to this new environment
created by this “structural break” or
“crucial experiment”.
4_ On the foundations
of knowledge
In general, two views on the
foundations of knowledge are
considered: empiricism and rationalism.
For the empiricist account, the main
instrument for the acquisition of
knowledge is experience; knowledge is
acquired through sense data. For the
rationalist view, the chief road to
knowledge is the exercise of reason,
arrived at by thought; ap r i o r i
reasoning has a central role for the
acquisition of knowledge.
However, “foundationalist”
views alone do not provide a reasonable
account of knowledge (Lawson, 1987,
p. 967). The empiricist account, which
claims the primacy of data and
data-analysis, is unsustainable, for there
is no data free of judgement and
interpretation; rationalist views, which
highlight the pre-eminence of ap r i o r i
reasoning, if they are to be free from
the same mistake, seem fated to end up
with a measure of relevance distinct
from realism of analysis.
Such a dualism is neither
necessary nor desirable. A more
encompassing explanation should
transcend this dichotomy: the
process of acquisition of knowledge
may entail both procedures, in a
continuous interchange:
knowledge can be understood, not as the
building of a superstructure upon an
unchanging foundation, but as
proceeding in stages where the
foundation at each new stage is the
previous one. In the course of acquiring
and developing knowledge, provisional
starting points come to be questioned
and criticised and existing views
are rethought and reinterpreted. Thus
despite strong temptations to draw
distinctions between what is immediately
given to the senses and what is
contributed by interpretation, these two
aspects – the immediate and the
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– cannot ultimately be separated.
Knowledge development involves thought
and experience where neither aspect can
be isolated as foundational in any
absolute and permanent way
(Lawson, 1987, p. 960-961).
Thus, the pursuit of absolute and
immutable foundations is no longer
justifiable. This is another manner of
stating that knowledge is fallible and
contingent.
5_ Knowledge: time and space
Acquisition of knowledge is constrained
by individual or group idiosyncratic
experiences. By their turn, experiences
take place in specific contexts, that is,
the spatio-temporal setting
fundamentally influences
decision-making processes.
Certainty is a provisional state
governed by many circumstances, from
the degree of confidence we have in a
given statement about a situation to the
discovery of new information not
available to others yet.2 But a
provisional state of certainty can only
be brought about because of the
pervasive uncertainty and complexity in
which human condition is immersed.
Knowledge and ignorance are
intrinsically related. My knowledge
now stems from my current
individual experience in a given
society, in a network of interactions in a
given time. It is knowledge built
through time in a process of constant
and recurrent acquisition and
discarding of information. Knowledge
has then a spatio-temporal dimension.
Because of that, there are differentials
of knowledge:
an agent may have fairly extensive
knowledge of the immediate environment,
be virtually ignorant of the remote
environment, and radically ignorant of
the future (Fleetwood, 1994, p. 27).
Theories of uncertainty, such as,
e. g., those of Knight, Keynes and
Shackle, stress the temporal dimension
of the fallibility and contingency of
knowledge. Theories of complexity,
such as Hayek’s and Simon’s, emphasise
the space dimension – ignorance
concerning the vast number of
interacting events taking place at the
same time in a given complex
environment; ignorance of the
interactions among the sub-systems of
this sub-environment, and so on.
Within relatively less complex
systems there is greater conformity of
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2 “Certainty is a
psychological state that one
can be in independently of
whether one is right or
wrong” (Grayling, 1995,
p. 51). As Hayek states,
“I prefer true but imperfect
knowledge, even if it leaves
much indetermined and
unpredictable, to a pretence
of exact knowledge that is
likely to be false” (Hayek,
1974, p. 29), a position
consistent with the principle
of fallible knowledge.belief, less dispersion of opinions, for
t h e r ei sl e s st ob ek n o w na n das m a l l e r
number of events taking place. In
contrast, the higher the degree of
complexity the higher our ignorance,
the higher the dispersion and variation
in such beliefs across people where the
interactions are more varied and
frequent. The degree of understanding
(of generating knowledge) changes with
the degree of complexity.
By combining both approaches
the result is that even if the future were
highly predictable and knowable,
knowledge would still be limited due to
the fact of complexity; conversely, even
if the environment were of a simple
character (for instance, the less complex
economic environment of Robinson
Crusoe), knowledge would still be
limited because in a historical time
setting future states of affairs are not
fully knowable. Reductionist accounts,
for not stressing the influence of both
complexity and the passage of time upon
decision-making processes, may then
provide a partial account of the factors
involved in many important situations.
If acquisition of knowledge is
bounded by space and time, then so is
the conduct which depends on its use.
Context defines not only the basis for
knowing something but also for
behaving upon it.3 The historical setting
bounds the processes throughout which
knowledge is being generated and used.
The context defines different social
practices and distinct social knowledge
embodied in those practices. For
instance, the conventions which govern
pricing decisions are different in
high-inflation economies and in
moderate-inflation economies. The
context of inflation determination in
Germany in the 1920’s (a classical
episode of hyperinflation) is not the
same of the American inflation in the
1990’s; or, still, of the Brazilian
inflationary experience of the 1980’s
(so-called chronic or inertial inflation).
Not only did peculiar features or
determinants take place in each of these
circumstances, but, also, specific
practices and behaviours were
generated. The consequence of not
emphasising the context-related aspects
of knowledge (and behaviour) is that
erroneous generalisations may arise.4
6_ Types of knowledge
For the purposes of the present
discussion, one could also say that there
are two types of knowledge:
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3 “Behaviouris highly
dependent upon the context in
which (context related)
knowledge is obtained”
(Lawson, 1985, p. 917). Or
further: “Human action always
takes place in some context and
human agency is conditioned by
context-related knowledge”
(Lawson, 1987, p. 964).
4 But, although one may say
that inflation has different
historical conditioners
according to distinct
conjunctures, there are also
elements which may be
c o m m o nt ov a r i o u sd i f f e r e n t
experiences which allow for
some qualified generalisations.“knowledge how”, or practical
knowledge, and “knowledge that”, or
theoretical knowledge (Ryle, 1949;
Polanyi, 1958 and Hayek, 1967).
The category “knowing how”
involves the practical execution of tasks,
the process of doing something, the
exercise of a skill, the capacity to perform
an activity. The category “knowing that”
consists of the thought of what is being
involved in “doing something”, the
process by which we are capable of
theorising about a performance. It relates
to acquiring information for explanation,
for conscious formulation.
A person may observe the rules
which are applied but this does not
mean that this person can also
formulate or fully understand them.
Practice precedes the theory of it.
As Ryle (1949, p. 30) states,
there are many classes of performances in
which intelligence is displayed, but the
rules or criteria of which are
unformulated.
Principles informing activities are
not generally known. No precise and
articulated knowledge of the constituent
detailed operations of a broader system
necessarily takes place. The “arts” of
skilful doing and skilful knowing are
thus differentiated:
It is therefore possible for people
intelligently to perform some sorts of
operations when they are not yet able to
consider any propositions enjoining how
they should be performed. Some intelligent
performances are not controlled by any
anterior acknowledgements of the
principles applied in themWe learn
how by practice, schooled indeed by
criticism and example, but often quite
unaided by any lessons in the theory
(Ryle, 1949, p. 30 and 41).
Polanyi has also adopted Ryle’s
approach as to the types of knowledge:
the aim of a skilful performance is
achieved by the observance of a set of
r u l e sw h i c ha r en o tk n o w na ss u c h
to the person following them (Polanyi,
1958, p. 49).
The unspecifiability of the process by
w h i c hw et h u sf e e lo u rw a yf o r w a r d
accounts for the possession by humanity
of an immense mental domain, not only
of knowledge but of manners, of laws
and the many different arts which man
knows how to use, comply with, enjoy
or live by, without specifiably knowing
their contents. Each single step in
acquiring this domain was due to an
effort which went beyond the hitherto
assured capacity of some person making
it, and by his subsequent realization
and maintenance of his success.
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originally passed the understanding of
its agent and of which he has ever since
remained only subsidiarily aware, as
part of a complex achievement
(Polanyi, 1958, p. 62-63).
This distinction is also useful to
think of the processes leading to the
formation of social rules of conduct.
Complexity entails dispersion of
knowledge, that is, the knowledge of
the circumstances of which people need
to make use never exists in
“concentrated or integrated form”, but
only as the “dispersed bits of
incomplete and frequently contradictory
knowledge” which each individual
agent possesses (Hayek, 1945, p. 519).
This “unorganized knowledge”, this
“knowledge of the particular
circumstances of time and place”, is
used by people in order to perform
their activities and, according to Hayek,
is not held by anyone in its entirety. In a
context of fragmented knowledge of
the relevant facts, we have not only the
unavoidable imperfection of human
knowledge but also
the consequent need for a process
by which knowledge is constantly
communicated and acquired
(Hayek, 1945, p. 530).
“Know how” is to act according
to rules without the need of being able
to explain them but merely being able
to follow them (Hayek, 1967, p. 44).
We always know more than we can
deliberately state. As Hayek states,
an observed movement is directly
translated into the corresponding action,
often without the observing and
imitating individual being aware of the
elements of which the action consists or
(in the case of man) being able to state
what he observes and does.In one
sense we thus know what we observe,
but in another sense we do not know
what it is that we thus observe
(Hayek, 1967, p. 47-48).
What we recognise as purposive
conduct is conduct following a rule
with which we are acquainted but
w h i c hw en e e dn o te x p l i c i t l yk n o w
(Hayek, 1967, p. 55).5
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5 These concepts have
many applications. One
could argue, for instance,
that standard practices in
economics fit this
characterisation quite well:
mainstream researchers or
economists “know how” to
use quantitative methods or
econometric techniques in
order to build models
(theories) and make
empirical tests and
predictions, but they do not
“know that” – in many
situations, their knowledge is
limited and insufficient for
the purposes intended. As
Keynes states, “Peace and
comfort of mind require that
we should hide from
ourselves how little we
foresee” (Keynes,
1937b, p. 124).Agents following rules know
“how” but not “that”. Rules (and other
types of socio-economic structures that
govern human behaviour) avoid the
necessity of knowing “that”. This
situation can be seen as a paradox:
agents possess knowledge “how”,
which is crucial to support their
everyday decisions; nevertheless, in
many respects, they do not have
knowledge “that”.6 This is the “paradox
of ignorance” (Fleetwood, 1996).
Thus, to fall back on socio-economic
structures such as rules, conventions
and routines can be both a conscious
or semi-conscious behaviour,
a way of obtaining some sort of
“safe” knowledge.
7_ Knowledge of the observed
and of the observer
From the above, it is also possible to
suggest a distinction between the
knowledge which is important for
agents taking decisions and the
knowledge which the observing analyst
can acquire by examining agents’
actions and their consequences.
Although not used by those
authors in this context, the analytical
split of “know how” and “know that” is
quite useful here. On the one hand, in
order to perform their activities, people
need to know how, and do not need to
explain why, those performances are
being done, or their underlying
mechanisms – they do not need to
know “that”. On the other hand, the
observer, if he/she aims to provide
explanations or descriptions of
phenomena, the relations and
regularities involved, she/he needs to
analyse the underlying mechanisms –
they do need to know “that” through
the investigation of behaviour of the
observed performers making use of
“knowledge how”. “Knowledge how”
is thus related to the actions of
observed people and “knowledge that”
is related to the acts of thought, the
theories and formulations of the
observing people (say, the economist,
the philosopher, the social scientist).
However, irrespective of the type
of knowledge associated with people
willing to know, the possibility that
knowledge is fallible and contingent
always exists. For both potential
knowers the possibility of errors poses
a challenge. Both acting and theorising
have to face the fact of the limitations
(or absence) of knowledge. One
implication is that claims such as that of
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6 “Agents ... appear as
skilful manipulators of a
vast range of knowledge
(‘how’) embodied in the
macro and micro social rules
of conduct. These rules
are necessarily drawn upon
in order for agents to
acquire and communicate
knowledge and engage in
socioeconomic activity”
(Fleetwood, 1996, p. 174).logical positivism, that “truth” can be
achieved by means only of empirically
observable and testable phenomena, or
the pretence of some optimistic but
wrong views of human behaviour, that
an agent has complete knowledge and
perfect foresight, are absurd.
8_ Knowledge beyond knowledge
Although it is not possible to know
everything, since much is happening
and will happen, it is also reasonable to
state that there is an objective,
“transcendental” reality whose existence
is independent of our knowledge of it.
Objects and relations exist
independently, at least in part, of the
enquiry of which they are objects;
but at the same time they are subject to
being consciously known (Lawson,
1987, p. 951).
Knowledge is both absolute
(objective) and relative (subjective):
there is such a thing as direct knowledge
which corresponds to our common
everyday understanding of the term. But
it is not a matter of absolute and pure
immediacy. Rather it is a relative
immediacy, depending upon our level of
biological and social development. The
directness of knowledge is relative in this
sense but, relative to such background
knowledge, etc., it is absolute (Lawson,
1987, p. 962).
This also begs the question of
the inherent intersubjectivity of
knowledge. An unsuitable way of
approaching how knowledge is acquired
and communicated is by concentrating
attention on the private domain of
individual awareness. Rather, it is
necessary to begin in the social domain,
for language is an activity essentially
public and intersubjective. Even our
thoughts have such intercommunicative
determination, for they are built on the
basis of our knowing a (socially
generated) language.
We are immersed in interactive
experiences. We are, like it or not,
necessarily engaged in the world; our
acquisition and accumulation of
knowledge is the result of our
multiple activities there.7 Language can
only be acquired in a public setting. A
private language, a private
“communication”, is impossible. One
only succeeds in speaking a language if
one follows the shared rules for the use
of its expressions. Therefore,
knowledge can only be known socially.
Individuals who depend on others in
their daily activities are social rather
than a-social individuals.
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7 Omission or seclusion is
only possible if there exists a
reference point from which
one intends to be omitted or
secluded. I can only be
completely “autonomous”
(say, a hermit) if I detach
myself from the social whole
which in principle I belong to.
But this social “entity” must
still be there to certify that I
am an “isolated” person from
the rest of society.I ti sw o r t ht on o t ei np a s s i n gt h a t
the importance of the social context in
the definition of knowledge is an
important aspect of both Keynes’s and
Hayek’s account of conventions and
social rules of conduct. Their views will
be discussed later.
Knowledge is essentially a social
product. It is established socially, as the
outcome of people’s social activities.
We cannot account for knowledge in
terms of the result of a process in the
mind of the isolated individual and to
find its roots in the individual
experience solely. An individual acting
alone, separated from contact with
other people and relying only on
herself, can obtain scarcely any
knowledge at all – perhaps only of very
particular facts. To state that we can
know nothing except our own
momentary existence is then a mistaken
way of approaching this subject.
The material world surrounding us
and other people are as important as
the socialised individual in an
account of knowledge.
Knowledge is accumulated and
acquired by individuals – just as
everything that mankind produces is
created by individuals. However, it is
production of knowledge by individuals
acting in co-operation, counting on one
another, and communicating their
experiences and their ideas. Each
individual acquires knowledge from
his/her own personal experience, but
this would not be possible if it were not
for the fact that she/he is in association
with others, and if she/he did not learn
from others what they have learned
before. Knowledge and language are
social products, the common dominion
of a society. Even those who make
outstanding contributions to the stock
of knowledge need some form of
communication and interchange to
those who at the end of day will not be
socially recognised as contributors of
that new knowledge – the huge social
web of material and intellectual
resources is the departing point for the
building up of all sorts of achievements.
It is only in society that we can
acquire and communicate knowledge.
It is the result of the interchange of
experiences among the components of
society in the progression of their
countless forms of social activity, and
it is screened and checked throughout
t h es a m ep r o c e s s .
The consequence is that the
aggregate of social knowledge – the
totality of knowledge stored and
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a given time – is always greater than the
particular bits of knowledge each
person can possibly possess. There
exists an evolving stock of social
knowledge at the disposal of people,
to which they contribute and to which
they can resort.
9_ Theories of fallible knowledge:
the approaches of Keynes
and Hayek
The idea of fallible knowledge can be
found in the works of many authors.
This section briefly scrutinises the
distinctive approaches of both
Keynes and Hayek, who immensely
contributed to the theme, although
from different perspectives.
Keynes and Hayek used distinct
methods for analysing economic
conduct, from which derived different
ideas about the stability properties of
economic systems, and divergent
conclusions about intervention and
policy. Despite their profound
differences in many topics (such as
methodology, the role of the State,
monetary theory and policy, causes of
unemployment etc.), there is an
important commonality in their works
in regard to the features of knowledge,
that is, their epistemological approaches
are similar in many respects.
9.1_ Keynes: uncertain knowledge
Keynes’s well-known version of
uncertainty is the soil from which a
huge bulk of research on the
subject has flourished (Keynes, 1936,
chapter 12; 1937a).
In the General Theory, Keynes
states that the formation of expectations
does not take considerably into account
those factors which are “very uncertain”.
Keynes differentiates “very uncertain”
from “very improbable” (Keynes, 1936,
p. 148, fn.). Although in specific
situations very uncertain facts may
become decisive, a reasonable guide to
current decisions is to consider those
facts to which an important degree of
confidence is ascribed. The formation of
long-term expectation is thus
over-influenced by the current state of
things, unless we have solid justifications
to change our opinions about the
existing situation. People’s “usual
practice” (a convention) is to take the
existing state of things and expect that
t h ef u t u r ew i l lb et h es a m e ,m o d i f i e d
only to the extent that they have “more
or less definite reasons for expecting a
change” (Keynes, 1936, p. 148).
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the state of long-term expectations,
w h i c hd e p e n do nb o t h“ t h em o s t
probable forecast we can make” and
the confidence with which we make
this forecast – on how highly we rate the
likelihood of our best forecast turning
out quite wrong (Keynes, 1936, p. 148).
The degree of confidence is thus
associated with the perceived degree of
uncertainty of the knowledge attached
to a possible future event.
Nonetheless, the foundation of
estimates of events in the distant future
“amount to little and sometimes to
nothing” (Keynes, 1936, p. 150),
for the knowledge upon which they are
based is scarce:
The outstanding fact is the extreme
precariousness of the basis of knowledge
on which our estimates of prospective
yield have to be made. Our knowledge of
the factors which will govern the yield of
an investment some years hence is
usually very slight and often negligible
(Keynes, 1936, p. 149).
Thus, for Keynes uncertainty
refers to a feature of knowledge of
future events which by its own nature
cannot be expressed in terms of a
quantifiable probability distribution:
By “uncertain” knowledge, let me explain,
I do not mean merely to distinguish what
is known for certain from what is only
probable. The game of roulette is not
subject, in this sense, to uncertainty; nor is
the prospect of a Victory bond being
drawn. Or, again, the expectation of life is
only slightly uncertain. Even the weather is
only moderately uncertain. The sense in
which I am using the term is that in which
the prospect of a European war is
uncertain, or the price of copper and the
rate of interest twenty years hence, or the
obsolescence of a new invention, or the
position of private wealth owners in the
social system in 1970. About these
matters there is no scientific basis on which
to form any calculable probability
whatever. We simply do not know
(Keynes, 1937a, p. 113-114).
That is, one is confronted with
a(n) (implicit) taxonomy of uncertainty
which posits a continuum between
knowledge and lack of knowledge, from
situations not subject to uncertainty
(where we have a certain amount of
knowledge) to “we simply do not know”
situations, where there are no elements
to calculate a probability distribution and
ignorance prevails. Uncertainty is thus an
attribute of knowledge, not of reality
(according to Lawson’s categorisation;
see Lawson, 1988).
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uncertainty can be conceptually
organised as follows:
_(calculable) probability: the game of
roulette, the prospect of a
Victory bond being drawn;
_slight uncertainty: the expectation
of life;
_moderate uncertainty: the weather;
_uncertainty ( i na na b s o l u t e
sense): the prospect of a
European war, the price of
copper and the rate of interest
twenty years hence, the
obsolescence of a new
invention, the position of
private wealth owners in the
social system thirty five years
hence, the yield of an
investment some years hence.
The latter meaning is the one
Keynes is most concerned with. In this
situation of genuine, radical uncertainty
( i na na b s o l u t es e n s e ,a sas t a t eo f
ignorance), there is no knowledge basis
upon which agents could specify any
quantitatively calculable probability, for
“we simply do not know”. In this case,
“the concealed factors of utter doubt,
precariousness, hope and fear” (Keynes,
1937a, p. 122) come to the surface and
affect agents’ mood more powerfully.
In this situation, agents are
coping with unknowables, although they
act upon something that they know (or
at least they believe they know). The
future will become present and check
their previous beliefs about the possible
results of their current decisions.
Knowledge is “fluctuating, vague and
uncertain” at the moment of the
decision-making process due to the
existence of a flux of time which is
irreversible and which contains the
germs of unknown and unexpected
situations. Agents’ knowledge is limited
due to the unlimited range of rival
possibilities that may take form in the
future. Thus, Keynes’s version of
uncertainty refers to a current state of
fallible and contingent knowledge in the
actual present concerning potential
competing futures.
Keynes’s version of uncertainty
can thus be the strategic scaffold for a
theory of knowledge based on a
“hypothesis of a non-calculable future”,
in the sense that under certain
circumstances there is no possibility
whatsoever of gathering enough
information to justify the use of known,
numerically measurable probabilities.
Uncertainty is identified not with
probabilistic knowledge but rather with
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“uncertainty is associated with a situation
wherein numerically determinate
probabilities are not to be had” (Lawson,
1988, p. 46 and 48).
But how does the existence of
uncertainty affect decision-making
processes? Both Keynes’s liquidity
theory of the rate of interest and
employment theory based on the
principle of effective demand, with
emphasis on the determinants of
investment decisions, are the areas in
which strong contrasts with the
conventional theory can be found.
Uncertainty surrounds strategic
economic decisions such as money
holdings and investment, that is, capital
(portfolio) decisions latu sensu.T h e r ea r e
no sufficient future markets or future
prices waiting to be known. It is in the
nature of a monetary economy that
time elapses between the taking of a
decision and the unknown outcomes of
the decision (Davidson, 1994).
Decisions to invest are the most
affected by the future, for in this case
the time span between decisions and
results is longer and the attempts at
escaping from illiquid positions are
costly and demand more time.
In sum, Keynes views
probabilities as beliefs attached to
propositions about events rather than
to events themselves. Uncertainty is a
property of knowledge, expressing
degrees of belief, not a property of
external material reality (Lawson, 1988).
That is, Keynes does not conceive
uncertainty in its ontologic aspect; he
stresses instead its epistemic form
(McCann, 1994, p. 52).
9.2_ Hayek: incurable ignorance
Hayek’s later multidisciplinary writings
(post 1960), the period covered by what
Fleetwood (1996) calls “Hayek III”, are
mainly concerned in providing
explanations of both the nature of
dispersed knowledge in a complex
world and how agents seek to cope with
this condition by resorting to social
rules of conduct. Society forms
institutions which assist in the
discovery, communication and storage
of knowledge. These institutions, in the
form of social rules of conduct and the
price system, make the existence of
(spontaneous) order in a capitalist
economy a real possibility.
For Hayek, in economics, as in
other social sciences, and unlike the
physical sciences, the observer deals
with “essentially complex phenomena”
or “structures of essential complexity”.
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t h es a m et i m ea n dm a n ye v e n t sh a v e
direct and remote connections with
other events:
t h ea s p e c t so ft h ee v e n t st ob ea c c o u n t e d
for about which we can get quantitative
data are necessarily limited and may not
include the important ones.[I]n the
study of such complex phenomena such
as the market, which depend on the
actions of many individuals, all the
circumstances which will determine
the outcome of a processwill hardly
ever be fully known or measurable
(Hayek, 1974, p. 24).
This notion of complexity
implies interdependence of actions.
Individual decisions must take into
account other people’s plans, for
complexity “depends not only on the
properties of the individual elements of
which they are composed, and the
relative frequency with which they
occur, but also on the manner in which
the individual elements are connected
with each other” (Hayek, 1974, p. 26-27).
If there is an endless number of
individuals performing many tasks in
their numerous activities, then there is
ignorance of many relevant facts. This
“incurable ignorance” of the particular
facts which are or will become known
to somebody affects the whole structure
of social activities. This structure
constantly adapts itself, and functions
through adapting itself, to millions of
facts which in their entirety are not
known to anybody (Hayek, 1973, p. 13).
Human mind is limited in its
capacity to acquire and process large
amounts of information. People are not
able to collect the aggregate of all
events, relations and forces at work
which composes a given complex order.
That is why knowledge about the world
is fragmented among all the participants
in an economic system. Dispersion of
knowledge stems from
the fact that each member of society can
have only a small fraction of the
knowledge possessed by all, and that
each is therefore ignorant of most of the
facts on which the working of society
rests. Yet it is the utilization of much
more knowledge than anyone can
possess, and therefore the fact that each
moves within a coherent structure most
of whose determinants are unknown to
him, that constitutes the distinctive
feature of all advanced civilizations
(Hayek, 1973, p. 14).
The “coherent structure most of
whose determinants are unknown” is
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which enables human actions but is
irreducible to them.
T h ei d e ao fd i s p e r s i o no f
knowledge is consistent throughout
Hayek’s works. In his article
“Economics and Knowledge” (1937),
Hayek alleges that the main concern for
economic analysis should be the
problem of the Division of Knowledge
which is quite analogous to, and at least
as important as, the problem of the
division of labour (Hayek, 1937, p. 49).8
Although attention has mainly
been focused on the latter, the former is
“the really central problem of
economics as a social science” (Hayek,
1937, p. 49). Social sciences need to
interpret how the spontaneous
interaction of a vast number of people,
each possessing fragments of
knowledge, produces a situation in
which prices fit costs and which could
be originated by “deliberate direction”
only by a mind who controlled the
knowledge dispersed among all the
persons involved:
the knowledge of the circumstances of
which we must make use never exists in
concentrated or integrated form, but
solely as the dispersed bits of incomplete
and frequently contradictory knowledge
which all the separate individuals
possess. The economic problem of society
is thus not merely a problem of how to
allocate “given” resources.It is rather
a problem of how to secure the best use
of resources known to any of the
members of society, for ends whose
relative importance only these
individuals know. Or, to put it briefly,
it is a problem of the utilization of
knowledge not given to anyone in its
totality.The various ways in which
the knowledge on which people base their
p l a n si sc o m m u n i c a t e dt ot h e mi st h e
crucial problem for any theory
explaining the economic process.
And the problem of what is the best way
of utilizing knowledge initially dispersed
a m o n ga l lt h ep e o p l ei sa tl e a s to n eo f
the main problems of economic policy –
or of designing an efficient economic
system (Hayek, 1945, p. 519-520).
Thus, a distinctive characteristic
of social life is this “unorganized
knowledge”: individuals are not in a
position to acquire “the knowledge of
the particular circumstances of time and
place” (Hayek, 1945, p. 521). However,
a tt h es a m et i m e ,s o m ep e o p l es e e kt o
make good use of the “special
knowledge of circumstances of the
fleeting moment not known to others”
(Hayek, 1945, p. 522). This may enable
them to obtain valuable information in
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8 “Through [the price
system] not only a division of
labor but also a coordinated
utilization of resources based
on an equally divided
knowledge has become
possible” (Hayek, 1945,
p. 528).that particular context and, in
conjunction with their specific skills, to
benefit from this in a way which
otherwise would not be available to
them. This knowledge consists of an
ability to discover particular
circumstances, which becomes effective
only if holders of this knowledge are
signalled in the market which sorts of
goods and services are required (and
how urgently).
If the consequences of the
emergence of new information are
important, then, for Hayek, the best use
of knowledge is made at a
“microeconomic” level. For if the
problem is mainly how to adapt to
changes in the “particular circumstances
of time and place”, Hayek believes that
decisions should be left to the
individuals directly involved with these
circumstances, who are supposed to
know promptly the relevant changes
and the resources available to perform
the ensuing right decisions:
The whole acts as one market, not
because any of its members survey the
whole field, but because their limited
individual fields of vision sufficiently
overlap so that through many
intermediaries the relevant information
is communicated to all. The mere fact
that there is one price for any commodity
brings about the solution which
(it is just conceptually possible) might
have been arrived at by one single
mind possessing all the information
which is in fact dispersed among
all the people involved in the process
(Hayek, 1945, p. 526).9
Athough complexity implies
ignorance, agents have at their disposal
practical means of acquiring useful
information. One is the price system, a
mechanism for discovering,
communicating and storing
information. The importance of this
system is the economy of knowledge
which it provides, or how little people
partaking in it need to know in order to
take their decisions. Thus, a suitable
metaphor for the price system is that
it is a “system of telecommunications”.
Notwithstanding, there is an
important source of information other
than the price system. Knowledge is
obtained not only via the “telecom
system” in isolation, “but by the
telecom system articulating with, and
embedded within, a dense web of social
rules of conduct” (Fleetwood, 1994, p. 6).
Social rules of conduct which
have evolved through time are an
important structure for knowledge
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9 Underlying this reasoning
there surely is an ideological
case for the non-intervention
of the State in the economic
domain which one does not
necessarily need to embrace.
Description and explanation
of mechanisms, processes,
phenomena etc. are not
always connected with a
particular prescription by
some kind of necessity.dissemination. While knowledge
dispersed in the price system has a
dynamic character, in the sense that it
induces agents to revise constantly their
plans, knowledge dispersed in a social
network of rules of conduct is
stabilising, in the sense that, by being
used, it continuously maintains the
stability of the social structure in which
agents happen to be inserted
(Fleetwood, 1996, p. 175).
In an account in many respects
similar to that of Keynes, Hayek
stresses that our ignorance stemming
from complexity imposes severe
limitations not only on the use of
knowledge by the observed agents, but
also on the knowledge the observing
analyst may acquire. The study of the
complex nature of the world brings a
different perspective for the analysis:
It seems indeed not improbable that, as
the advance of the sciences penetrates
further and further into more complex
phenomena, theories which merely
provide explanations of the principle,
or which merely describe a range of
phenomena which certain types of
structures are able to produce, may
become more the rule than the exception.
And the more we move into the realm
of the very complex, the more our
knowledge is likely to be of the principle
only, of the significant outline rather
than of the detail. Especially where we
have to deal with the extreme complexity
of human affairs, the hope of ever
achieving specific predictions of
particulars seems vain. It would appear
to be an evident impossibility for a
human brain to specify in detail that
‘way of acting, feeling, and thinking
channelled by a society out of an infinite
number of potential ways of thinking’,
whichis the essence of culture
(Hayek, 1967, p. 20).
Human affairs can be so
extremely complex that they place
immense obstacles to those engaged in
making predictions. In the face of
complexity, one should aim to delineate
at best “explanations of the principle”,
“significant outline rather than detail”,
“pattern recognition” (Hayek). Or, as
Keynes says, “first, dubious
approximations” (Keynes, 1926,
p. 262). Such concerns led Hayek to say
that “[i]t is high time, however, that we
take our ignorance more seriously”
(Hayek, 1967, p. 39).
For Hayek, it is impossible for a
single agent or a group of agents to
know all the particular facts that
condition a given socio-economic
order. Social rules of conduct (a form
of knowledge) are the natural,
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world of ignorance. They function as a
method for dealing with our “incurable
ignorance”. Knowledge and ignorance
play important roles in Hayek’s theory.
The “problem of knowledge” as the
problem of limited, fallible knowledge
is central to his theory (as it is for
Keynes’s). He focuses on the fact that
people’s “irremediable ignorance” may
bring about insurmountable obstacles:
It is the extent of our ignorance which
makes it necessary that in the use of
k n o w l e d g ew es h o u l db el i m i t e da n d
should refrain from many actions whose
unpredictable consequences might place
us outside the order within which alone
the world is tolerably safe for us.
It is only thanks to such restraints
that our limited knowledge of positive
f a c t ss e r v e su sa sar e l i a b l eg u i d ei nt h e
sea of ignorance in which we move
(Hayek, 1968, p. 87-88).
Nevertheless, for Hayek there
is a form of knowledge with a
p o s i t i v er o l e .T h ei d e ao f“ t a c i t
knowledge” comes to the fore
(borrowed from the accounts of Ryle
and Polanyi, as seen before). This
type of knowledge (how) is practical
and specific; essentially, it is
knowledge of social rules of conduct:
So long as the individuals act in
accordance with rules it is not necessary
that they be consciously aware of the
rules. It is enough that they know how
to act in accordance with the rules without
knowing that the rules are such and
such in articulated terms (Hayek, 1973, p. 99).
[T]here is a difference between following
rules of conduct, on the one hand, and
knowledge about something, on the other
(a difference … between “knowing how”
and “knowing that”). … The habit of
following rules of conduct … ought to be
seen for what it is, the skill to fit oneself
into, or align oneself with, a pattern of
whose very existence one may barely be
aware and of whose ramifications one
has scarcely any knowledge. Most people
can, after all, recognise and adapt
themselves to several different patterns of
conduct without being able to explain or
describe them (Hayek, 1988, p. 78).
Much of knowledge and skills
drawn upon in people’s activities are
known only tacitly. If a conscious
reflection upon each act is not feasible,
then much of the knowledge upon which
we draw must exist at the level of tacit
(practical) consciousness; it constitutes
tacitly sustained or tacit (practical)
knowledge: “There is a difference and a
potential gap between what is said and
what is done” (Lawson, 1997, p. 178).
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as social knowledge
From what has been said above, it is
evident that knowledge has to be
related to its use. In this case, one has
to leave epistemology, the study of
knowledge, and enter into ethics, the
study of human conduct.
Economic knowledge consists in
the amount of information to which
agents can resort in order to inform
their decisions in the economic sphere.
Also here, certainty of knowledge is
hard to achieve. Knowledge, being
subject to change, is provisional and
fallible. Since we cannot claim for a
definite truth concerning our
k n o w l e d g ew ea r el e dt ob e h a v et oa
great extent according to what is
realisable, or reasonable, in the
circumstances – we do the very best we
can, the possible.10
We have to act, despite the fact
that we acknowledge that the
satisfactory achievement of our aims
lies beyond our grasp. People try to
cope with this condition by resorting to
social practices like conventions
(Keynes) and rules (Hayek). To fall
back on conventions and rules may
increase the predictability of people’s
actions. This pacifies their anxiety
concerning their irremediable lack of
k n o w l e d g e( o rah i g hd e g r e eo f
uncertainty) in many circumstances and
may render the results of actions more
profitable. Conventions and rules can
promote coherence and play a
stabilising role in an unstable and
unordered reality.
The resort to conventions and
rules is a practical response for the
possibility of misjudgement. As such,
these socio-economic structures are like
a vehicle for knowledge adjustment.
The fact that agents fall back on
conventions and rules when they make
decisions allows for the possibility of
error correction. Following or departing
from a convention or a rule may
engender penalty or reward. This is the
form behaviour is adjusted and is an
important source of assessment of the
validity of agents’ previous expectations
and subsequent actions. Thus,
conventions and rules act as an
objective standard of reference which
enables individuals to correct and
re-direct their previous judgements in
the light of realised results (or rather to
k e e pt h es a m ec o u r s eo fa c t i o ni fi t
reveals to be successful over time).
To fall back upon conventions
and rules is also indeed a form of
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10 But the very best may not
accord to a narrow
maximising rule of behaviour.rational behaviour (different, of course,
from the idealisation of behaviour
advocated by the utilitarian view of the
rational choice theory).
Notwithstanding the fact that
knowledge about the future states of
affairs is usually regarded as
non-acquirable, rational behaviour is
still propitiated by the general and
extensive knowledge of “current ways
of doing things” that the individual can
get by being a member of society, and
by actively participating in it (Lawson,
1985, p. 920). Conventions and rules
embody these “current ways of doing
things” which economic agents cannot
be precluded from observing whenever
they need to make decisions (for a more
detailed discussion on this subject, see
Andrade, 1998).
11_ Conclusion
This paper discussed the nature and
role of knowledge in a socio-economic
life marked by uncertainty. The starting
point was to regard that uncertain
environments render knowledge fallible
and contingent.
The analytical prominence
imputed to uncertainty implies that
agents face enormous obstacles and
limitations in their capabilities of
apprehending or knowing the endless
number of current (and future) events
taking place in the real world. As such,
they cannot fully perceive or identify
many facts of actual experience.
Besides, the environment itself,
the structures shaping and being
shaped by human action, is so
characteristically complex and uncertain
that it poses the problem of the
feasibility of their full accountability by
an individual mind or even a group of
well-informed individuals.
Agents are always going to have
imperfect, limited knowledge, subject
to some sort of revision in the light of
experience. As a practical solution to
copinge with this condition, they
resort to some kind of social practice
as conventions and rules. To a certain
degree, conventions and rules allow
for and assist the formation of beliefs
in the relative certainty and simplicity
of the environment in order to try to
overcome the uncertainties and
complexities actually underlying
reality. A more comprehensive
analysis of the nature and uses of
knowledge should be grounded upon
the hypothesis of fallible and
contingent knowledge.
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knowledge does not put a strong
emphasis on an exclusive source for the
acquisition of knowledge (by either
reason or experience) but rather sees
thought and sense data as combined
sources for this aim. It is not therefore
a foundationalist account of knowledge.
Knowledge is fallible for reasons
associated both with interactions in
space taking place at the same time
(complexity), and with the passage of
time. Both combine to create distinct
levels of uncertainty.
The paper also stressed, for
analytical purposes, two types of
knowledge, namely, “knowledge how”
and “knowledge that”. The former is
t h ek n o w l e d g eo ft h ew a yw ep e r f o r m
something and the second is the
knowledge of why it is that we perform
something. The latter is normally a
special preserve of the analyst or
observer achieved by interpreting the
use of “knowledge how” by his/her
object of study.
If knowledge is imperfect, and if
people face practical difficulties in fully
grasping all the information which is
relevant, then an “objective reality”
beyond our subjective experience and
thoughts exists. However, this reality is
also subject, although partially, to being
increasingly understood and theorised.
One way that people find to cope
with the condition of fallible and
contingent knowledge is to resort, as a
practical solution, to conventions and
rules (a subject matter that Keynes and
Hayek analysed at length). Conventions
and rules are the repository of a social,
intersubjective form of knowledge,
which agents may acquire, store and
communicate with each other. They
partly provide the necessary
information for the undertaking of their
daily activities under conditions of
uncertainty and ignorance.
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